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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P et~tioner, 
-vs.-
JAMES L. HATCH and DELLA L. 
HATCH, 
Respondents. 
Case. No. 
8937 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The State of Utah hereby petitions this Court for 
a rehearing and reconsideration of this case on the fol-
lowing grounds : 
I. 
EXCHANGES WITH THE UNITED STATES CANNOT 
LOGICALLY BE INCLUDED UNDER SECTION 65-1-14 AND 
EXCLUDED UNDER SECTION 65-1-15. 
II. 
SECTION 65-1-15 IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND ITS IN-
TENT IS CLEAR. 
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III. 
NO EVIDENCE EXISTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRA·C-
TICES WHICH WOULD THWART THE PLAIN PURPOSE 
OF THE LAW. 
IV. 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION CONTEMPLATES DE-
CISION BY FIVE JUDGES NOT FOUR JUDGES. 
In support of the grounds above stated, the following 
brief is submitted. 
Respectfully, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, State of 
Utah 
DENNIS McCARTHY, 
Special Assistant, 
Counsel for Petitioner 
I. 
EXCHANGES WITH THE UNITED STATES CANNOT 
LOGI·CALLY BE INCLUDED UNDER SECTION 65-1-14 AND 
EXCLUDED UNDER SECTION 65-1-15. 
The majority opinion disposes of this important case 
by deciding but two issues. First, the majority decides 
what it denominates a "prelinrinary question": Whether 
the State Land Board has authority to exchange state 
owned lands with the United States. To this an affirma-
tive answer is given. Secondly, the 1najority determines 
what it <·.ails •·the eritical question": "\Yhether in an ex-
change of state owned lands with the Federal GoYern-
ment, minerals were reserved to the State subsequent 
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3 
to the enactment of Section 5575X, Laws of Utah 1919 
(now Section 65-1-15, U.C.A., 1953). This is answered in 
the negative. 
A close examination of the rationale/ by which the 
majority opinion reaches its· decision on each of these 
questions is revealing. Consider first the preliminary 
question, the authority of the State Land Board to 
exchange lands with the United States. The majority 
properly recognizes that authority for such a transaction 
must be found in the state statutes. The opinion states: 
"Such authority must be found in Sections 65-1-14, 
65-1-27, 65-1-70, U.C.A., 1953." The opinion then quotes 
the essential language of the first two sections, namely 
65-1-14 and 65-1-27, apparently in the belief that these 
two sections more nearly support its point of view. But 
the third section, 65-1-70, is neither quoted nor discussed. 
Indeed, after its initial citation, it seemingly disappears 
forever from the case, since it is neither cited nor re-
ferred to again. 
We must conclude, therefore, that the majority's 
conclusion with respect to the source of authority of the 
State Land Board is not seriously based upon the pro-
visions of 65-1-70. As pointed out in appellant's prior 
briefs, at the time of the exchange transaction involved 
in this case, Section 65-1-70 (formerly Section 5618) pro-
vided that "no exchange shall be made by the land board 
until a patent for the land so received in exchange shall 
have been issued by the government of the United States 
to such proprietors or their grantors." It is obvious that 
the statute neither contemplates nor authorizes an ex-
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4 
change of lands with the United States itself. Further, 
the statute's limited authority is restricted to situations 
where the exchange is necessary "in order to compact ... 
the land holdings of the state," whereas the undisputed 
evidence in this case contradicts that any purpose "to 
compact" was involved. Perhaps these considerations 
deterred the majority opinion from quoting or seriously 
relying upon 65-1-70 as a source of power for the State 
Land Board. 
Apparently, the majority felt, however, that some 
reliance could be placed upon Section 65-1-27 (formerly 
Section 5580) as a source of authority, since the essential 
provisions of this statute are quoted as follows: " ... The 
land board is hereby empowered to cancel, relinquish, or 
release the claims of the state to, and to reconvey to the 
United States, any particular tract of land erroneously 
listed to the state, or any tract upon which, at the time 
of selection, a bona fide claim has been initiated by an 
actual settler." Without ambiguity, the grant of authority 
contained in this section is strictly limited to two situ-
ations (1) to land erroneously listed to the state, and 
(2) to land on which a bona fide elaiin has been initiated 
by an actual settler. Nothing could be n1ore specific. The 
statutory language does not touch upon or refer, in even 
the re1notest sense. to any grant of power to the State 
Land Board to Inake exchanges of state owned school 
sections with the Federal GoYennnent. It seen1s incon-
ceivable that the three able judges who joined in the 
majority opinion could haYt> placed much reliance, if any 
at all, upon Section 6!l-1-27 as eonstituting the necessary 
grant of authority to the State Land Board. 
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We believe that the majority op1n1on necessarily 
must have relied primarily upon the provisions of Section 
65-1-14 as constituting the source of the authority of the 
State Land Board. In 1925, the date here pertinent, that 
statute read as follows : 
"Section 5575. Control of State lands-lease 
-sellJ etc.-reserve. The State land board shall 
have the direction, management and control of all 
lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be 
granted to this State, by the United States govern-
ment, or otherwise ... for any and all purposes 
whatsoever ... , and shall have the power to sell 
or lease the same for the best interests of the 
State and in accordance with the provisions of 
this chapter and the constitution of this State; 
... And provided, further, that in all cases lands 
containing coal or other minerals shall be reserved 
from sale ... " (1925 Session Laws of Utah, Chap. 
31, Sec. 5575) 
We agree with the majority opinion that the above 
quoted section and its companion section, Sec. 5575X2 
(now 65-1-17) relating to the authority of the State Land 
Board to sell the surface of state owned lands, probably 
constitute the basic authority - if any exists - of the 
State Land Board to make an exchange of lands with 
the United States. Certainly, if the Land Board has such 
authority, it must be found within the framework of 
these two sections, 65-1-14 and 65-1-17. 
But assuming this interpretation of the pertinent 
statutes by the majority opinion, certain conclusions 
inevitably must follow. Sections 65-1-14 and 65-1-17 con-
fer no express authority on the State Land Board to 
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exchange lands with the Federal Government. Certainly, 
the language of 65-1-14 giving the Board the "direction, 
management, and control" of state lands falls short of 
conferring the necessary authority to make such an ex-
change. In fact, the only express authority contained in 
65-1-14 to alienate state lands, either the fee or the 
surface, consists in the conferred power to "sell." N eces-
sarily, it must be assumed, therefore, that the majority 
opinion implicitly concludes that the power to "sell" 
conferred on the Land Board by the two cited sections 
includes an "exchange" with the United States. And we 
agree - so far as surface rights to state owned lands 
are concerned. The limited number of decisions in point, 
tend to support such a construction of the word "sell." 
Newton v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 37 Idaho 
58, 219 Pac. 1053; Bridgforth v. Middleton, 184 Miss. 632, 
186 So. 837. 
The majority opm1on then turns to the "critical 
question" whether Section 5575X (now 65-1-15) applies 
to an exchange of state owned lands with the Federal 
Government. Here the ·majority reaches a diametrically 
opposite conclusion from the logical implications of the 
answer given to the "prelilninary question" with respect 
to the authority of the State Land Board. The majority 
interprets Sections 5575X as not including an exchange 
with the United States. In so detennining, the 1najority 
necessarily reverses the very reasoning in1plicit in its 
conclu~ion that a ''sale" under Section 5575 includes an 
exchange with the United States. 
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Section 5575X states : 
"All coal and other mineral deposits in lands 
belonging to the State are hereby reserved to the 
State. Such deposits are reserved from sale ex-
cept upon a rental and royalty basis as herein 
provided and the purchaser of any land belonging 
to the State shall acquire no right, title or interest 
in or to sueh deposits ... " (1919 Session Laws of 
Utah, Chap. 107, Sec. 5575X) 
It is to be noted that Sections 5575, 5575X and 
5575X2 all were enacted by the 1919 Legislature as a 
comprehensive single chapter of laws relating to the 
"control of state lands." Since they were enacted as com-
panion statutes, they must be read together and con-
strued together. They are in pari materia in every sense 
of that term. If the power of the Land Board in Section 
5575 to "sell" state lands includes an exchange of lands 
with the Federal Government, then the reservation of 
mineral deposits from "sale'' in Section 5575X cannot 
logically be read to exclude such an exchange. A "sale'' 
under 5575 cannot include an exchange with the United 
States, and a "sale" under 5575X exclude an exchange 
with the United States, without doing violence to the 
entire statutory scheme. In so construing these related 
sections, the majority opinion is unsound and illogical, 
we respectfully submit. 
It is significant that Section 5575 (65-1-14), the very 
section which the majority opinion cites as the authority 
of the State Land Board to make exchanges with the 
Federal Government, itself contains a mineral reserva-
tion. By its terms it reserves from "sale" "i;n all cases 
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lands containing coal or other minerals." If, as the ma-
jority opinion holds, Section 5575 authorizes exchanges 
with the Federal Government, would the majority opinion 
also exclude exchanges with the Federal Government 
under Section 5575 of lands known to be mineral, not-
withstanding the language expressly reserving such lands 
from "sale"~ To do so would violate the clear statutory 
intent. So also, to construe similar language reserving 
all mineral deposits from "sale'' under 5575X as exclud-
ing exchanges with the United States just as clearly 
would be contrary to the manifest legislative intent. 
It is of interest to note that the 1959 Session of the 
Utah Legislature, in reenacting Section 65-1-15 added the 
following provision: 
"A.nd provided further that, when making in-
deinnity selections using \ested school lands as 
base, the board (State Land Board) may- release 
to the United States the state's mineral interests 
in the base lands provided the state acquires the 
nuneral interests in the selected public domain.'' 
(Laws of rtah, 195~1. Chap. 131, See. 65-1-15) 
Her0 again, the intent of these related statutes is made 
elear. lf the sweeping 1nineral reservation of 5515:S: 
(now ();)-1-1;)) ha.d been intended not to apply to e:s:-
ehanges with the Federal GoYerninent, it certainly was 
unn<'<'<'~~:u·~· for the leg-islature in E15~1 to enact a 
~tatut<' <'xpn'~~~~- empow·ering the State Land Board 
to n'l<'a~<' t]w stah' ·~ interest in n1inerals in exchanges 
with tiH' f1\'dt'ral Oon'rmnent. If, as the Inajorit~- opinion 
hold~. ~<'dion 65-1-15 pennits exchanges with the Federal 
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Government without a mineral reservation, the 1959 
amendment scarcely need have been enacted. Obviously, 
the legislature thought the 1959 amendment necessary, 
for the reason that it considered Section 65-1-15 as 
it existed did not authorize exchanges with the Federal 
Government without a mineral reservation. 
II. 
SECTION 65-1-15 IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND ITS IN-
TENT IS CLEAR. 
As stated, the majority opinion determines the so-
called "critical" question in this case by concluding that 
the mineral reservation statute, Section 5575X, Laws of 
Utah 1919 (now 65-1-15, U.C.A. 1953) does not include 
exchanges of vested state lands with the United States. 
According to the majority, this conclusion in turn is 
based on a "look to its (the statute's) purpose in the 
light of its history and background." Laying aside for 
the moment the merits of the so-called "history and 
background" cited, let us examine the legal principle 
which sanctions such a look at the "history and back-
ground." 
It is simple hornbook law that legislative history 
and background may be resorted to in construing a 
statute only if the statute is ambiguous. 50 Am. Jur., 
Statutes §225. Is the statute here involved in that cate-
gory~ The first sentence of the statute reads: 
"All coal and other mineral deposits in land 
belonging to the state are hereby reserved to the 
state ... " 
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Wherein is the ambiguity in this simple, straightforward, 
all inclusive sentence~ Would it be less ambiguous if it 
read: 
"All coal and other mineral deposits in land 
belonging to the state are hereby reserved to the 
state, including the minerals in state owned school 
sections exchanged with the Federal Government." 
\Ve submit that the suggested addition adds no mean-
Ing to the statute not fully contained in the language 
used. Either the reservation means what it says or it 
means nothing. No research into history or background 
is necessary to explore its meaning. It means what the 
words in their slinple, ordinary and customary usage 
clearly state - that all minerals in lands belonging to 
the state are hereby reserved to the state. In the light 
of the plain meaning and obvious intent of this unam-
biguous reservation, we submit that the majority opinion 
errs in attempting to read an exception into the statute 
by consulting "history and background" to determine the 
statute's "correct application." 
Let us now consider the ·"history and background" 
relied upon by the Inajorit~~ opinion. Disappointingly. we 
find it consists of nothing n1ore than a report by a Com-
Inittee (not even a legislative connnittee) appointed by 
the then Governor in 1917. to conduct an audit and 
investigation of state agencies. inc.luding an1ong others 
the State Land Board, to uncover discrepancies in the 
management and disposition of public funds. The Com-
mittee's subsequent report to the Governor, among other 
things, cited examples of favoritis1n practiced b~~ the 
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Land Board in making sales of state lands to certain 
individuals and contained suggestions for elimination of 
this practice. The report also recommended that the sale 
of all state lands be suspended for five years. It con-
tained no reference to exchanges of land with the Fed-
eral Government, except an incidental suggestion that the 
state should take steps to secure favorable national legis-
lation to permit the exchange of worthless school sections 
within forest reserves. 
The mineral reservation statute, Section 5575X was 
enacted by the 1919 Legislature soon after the submission 
of this report to the Governor. As stated by the majority 
opinion, the report "contains no suggestion or intimation 
that anything was amiss in the exchanges with the federal 
government." From the fact of this omission, the ma-
jority then leaps to the conclusion, that "it is quite 
apparent that the legislature intended no such (mineral) 
reservation in such exchanges (with the United States)." 
In all candor, we respectfully ask whether this is 
a fair and reasonable deduction to make as to probable 
legislative intent with respect to the sale or other dispo-
sition of state owned lands to the Federal Government~ 
The legislature obviously rejected the suggestion of the 
Governor's committee for a moritorium on the sale of 
state lands, but instead enacted an all inclusive mineral 
reservation statute. Because a committee's report to the 
Governor fails to mention anything concerning exchanges 
with the Federal Government, does it really become 
"quite apparent" from such omission that the legislature 
intended to exclude exchanges with the Federal Govern-
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ment notwithstanding the inclusive language of the 
statute~ Significantly, the report involved is not even a 
report of a legislative committee, but of a committee 
appointed by a Governor two years previous. The report 
in no way concerns itself with the subject of a reserva-
cion of minerals in state owned lands. It is entirely silent 
with respect to the matter of whether minerals should 
be reserved in transactions with the Federal Government 
or any one else. Surely, evidence of legislative intent 
must be based on less flimsy stuff than this ! 
If legislative intent is to be explored to such length, 
why does the majority opinion fail even to mention the 
one solid fact of legislative history that is available~ As 
pointed out in appellant's Reply Brief, the 1919 Senate 
Journal contains a significant notation with respect to 
Section 5575X. The original bill was S.B. X o. 58. On page 
267 of the Senate Journal is the following notation: 
"Committee on Public Affairs recommends 
Bill for passage - with certain amendments. 
1. On p. 2 beginning on line 7 strike out the 
following words: 'except as otherwise expressly 
authorized b)~ law.' ,. 
The Sessions Laws of Utah 1919, Chapter 107, page 30~. 
probably sets forth the bill in approxiinatel~~ the same 
format as the original bill (no copy of the original bill 
is obtainable). Lines 7 and 8, page 2 of the bill as set 
forth in the Session Laws. contain the first sentence of 
the all inclusive 1nineral reservation, reading: ··~ill coal 
and other mineral deposits in lands belonging to the 
state are hereby reserved by the state.,. 'Yithout doubt, 
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the phrase "except as otherwise expressly authorized by 
law" was a proposed modifying clause following the 
first sentence of the quoted statute. The striking of this 
phrase from the first sentence, certainly is clear evidence 
that the legislature intended no exceptions or limitations 
to its all inclusive general reservation. 
Under the interpretation the majority gives to Sec-
tion 65-1-15, the statute permits the conveyance of 
minerals in state owned lands in transactions with the 
United States, while at the same time prohibiting such 
conveyances and transactions with other persons or en-
tities. Such a construction obviously results in an un-
warranted discrimination in favor of the United States, 
and is in violation of Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution which requires that "all laws of a general 
nature shall have a uniform operation." Even though 
there might be circumstances under which the legislature 
might differentiate between an exchange of lands with 
the United States and an exchange with a private person, 
such differentiation would have to find a reasonable basis 
in terms of statutory language. Here the statute set8 
forth no basis for any such discrimination, and it con-
tains no restrictions nor exceptions whatsoever with 
respect to its application. 
What the majority opinion does is to take a statute 
(65-1-15) which is clear and unambiguous on its face, 
and read into it an exception in favor of the Federal 
Government. This we respectfully submit is unadulter-
ated judicial legislation. Apparently, the majority indulge 
' 
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in such legislative expediency because of its fear of the 
consequences or the upsetting effects of a decision which 
would confirm a literal reading of the statute. In Newton 
v. State Board of Land Commissoiners, 37 Idaho 58, 319 
Pac. 1053, the Idaho Supreme Court had the same prob-
lem, but instead of "ducking" it by twisting an exception 
into the law, it faced up to the literal language of the 
state law, regardless of what "confusion in the titles to 
lands" might result from its ruling. \Ye respectfully 
suggest that it is not for this Court to worry about the 
possible effects of its decision, but to apply the law as 
it exists. The legislature, not the Court should make 
changes if any are needed. 
III. 
NO EVIDENCE EXISTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRAC-
TICES WHICH WOULD THWART THE PLAIN PURPOSE 
OF THE LAW. 
The majority opinion concludes with what is seem-
ingly believes is a clinching statement: 
"When the Land Board, our legislature, the 
United States and lando·wners succeeding to its 
interests have all treated such exchanges as Yest-
ing fee title in the lTnited States for a period of 
nearly 40 years, it would seen1 1nanifestly unfair 
to now pennit the state to assert that it had re-
~erved the 1nineral rights in all such lands." 
W 0 respectfully challengf' the factual basis for this state-
ment. There i~ not a scintilla of eYidence in the reeord 
of the ease before the Court, nor in any records of the 
Land Board of whieh judicial notice 1uay be taken, whic.h 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
indicates that the Land Board regarded such exchanges 
as vesting fee title in the United States. True, the Selec-
tion Lists and Approved Lists are silent with respect 
to any mineral reservation, but the mere silence of these 
legal instruments cannot be considered as evidence that 
the Land Board "treated such exchanges as vesting fee 
title in the United States." In fact, successive opinions 
by several Utah State Attorneys General since 1931 ad-
dressed to the State Land Board or its employees are 
squarely to the contrary. Several of these opinions are 
reprinted as an Appendix to this brief. In the face of 
these opinions, it is inconceivable that the Land Board 
thought it conveyed or intended to convey a fee title 
without a mineral reservation, in exchanges of vested 
school sections with the Federal Government. 
Where also is the evidence is this case or the avail-
able legislative history which indicates that the state 
legislature has "treated such exchanges as vesting title 
in the United States"~ As demonstrated in our several 
briefs, the clear and unambiguous intent of the pertinent 
statutes is to the contrary. So also is the legislative 
history to the extent it exists as herein pointed out. 
vVhere is the evidence of facts which establish that 
the United States and landowners succeeding to ih; 
interest have "treated such exchanges as vesting fee title 
in the United States"~ Except for the self-serving asser-
tions to that effect by counsel for the respondents and 
counsel for the United States and the other amicus 
parties, we submit that the record in this case and other-
wise is barren of any such evidence. 
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The majority opinion also refers to certain other 
Utah statutes which it claims substantiate its conclusion 
with respect to the administrative practice of dealing 
with state owned lands. One such statute referred to is 
a 1927 Act authorizing the State Land Board to convey 
certain lands to the United States for use as a Migratory 
Bird Refuge (Chapter 56, Section 1, Laws of Utah, 1927). 
The majority points to the fact that this Act ex-
pressly reserves minerals and therefore indicates an 
intent that general statutes such as 65-1-15 do not require 
such a reservation where the United States is involved. 
But Chapter 56, Section 1, Laws of Utah, 1927, was not 
enacted for the special purpose of making an express 
mineral reservation. The Act authorized the conveyance 
of specified lands to the United States either as a sale 
or a gift. The Utah statutes did not then and do not now 
authorize either a gift or a sale of lands even to the 
United States, except in the manner provided by law. 
Section 65-1-29, which was in force at the time of the 
said special act, prescribed a definite procedure for the 
sale of state lands including an appraisal and a sale at 
not less than the appraised values. Chapter 56 was 
necessary, therefore, not for the purpose of 1naking a 
reservation of 1ninerals, but rather for the purpose of 
authorizing the basic transaction. \Yithout a special act 
the State could not have conveyed the lands under the 
circumstances. In addition, the special act was required 
in order to make it clear that the conveyance was made 
on the condition that Senate Bill 5454, then pending 
before Congress, or a like bill, be enacted. In the same 
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sessiOn of the legislature, a resolution was adopted 
1nemorializing Congress to pass Senate Bill 5454, pro-
viding for a proposed reclamation project in the Bear 
Lake area. 
In the light of the foregoing, it is not fair to infer 
from the enactment of Chapter 56, a legislative intent 
that general statutes such as 65-1-15 do not require a 
reservation of minerals in transactions with the United 
States. The same statute, Chapter 56, was referred to 
in an opinion by the Attorney General of the State of 
Utah, George P. Parker, dated 1\fay 28, 1931, as evi-
dencing an intention on the part of the legislature that 
minerals be reserved to the State. The opinion states: 
"Right here it is interesting to note Chapter 
56, Laws of 1927, by the provisions of which the 
legislature authorized the State Land Board to 
convey to the United States title to certain lands 
in the vicinity of the mouth of Bear River ... Such 
condition is indicative of the determination of the 
legislature to safeguard the minerals of the State. 
I cannot find that the legislature has ever au-
thorized any State Land Board to waive minerals 
to the United States in lands selected but since 
the year 1919 when the State mineral reservation 
Act became effective, it has been the policy of 
the State to reserve all minerals to itself and to 
dispose of them only by lease." 
The majority opinion also refers to two statutes 
enacted in 1929. The footnote to the majority opinion 
refers to both acts as Chapter 2, Section 1, Laws of Utah, 
1929. Apparently this is an inadvertent error. Chapter 
2, Section 1 of the Laws of 1929, is an Act whereby the 
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State authorizes the acquisition by the United States 
by purchase, gift or lease, of certain areas of land or 
water for the establishment and maintenance of Bear 
River Migratory Bird Refuge. Chapter 2, Section 2 ex-
pressly reserves the mineral rights to the State of ctah. 
The primary purpose of this special legislation, like the 
purpose of Chapter 56, Laws of 1927, was to permit a 
gift or sale of lands which would not otherwise be al-
lowed by state law. As stated, the Utah laws at that 
time did not permit a gift of lands and permitted a sale 
only on the terms set forth in Section 65-1-29, U.C.A., 
1953, and its predecessor acts. Clearly, the purpose of 
the Bird Refuge Act was to permit the basic transaction, 
not to permit a reservation of minerals. The other Act 
which the majority opinion apparently has reference to, 
Chapter 1, of the Laws of l~tah, 1929, authorized the 
State to quit claim to the lTnited States of ~lmerica, 
without cost, certain lands located in Township 3 North, 
Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base & Jieridian. This special 
legislation was again required for the smne reasons set 
forth above. No provision was n1ade therein for the 
reservation of minerals. 
The Inajorit~~ opinion states that the only conclusion 
to be drawn fron1 the express 1nineral reservations and 
on1issions in these special enachnents is that the legisla-
ture and the Land Board did not consider the 1919 
mineral re~wrvation applicable to the Federal Govern-
Inent. We sub1nit that the n1ore reasonable conclusion is 
that such special t)~pe legislation. considered in light of 
the Utah statutes whieh did not authorize a gift of lands 
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and authorized a sale only for an appraised considera-
tion, is that the legislation was necessary in order to 
authorize the basic transaction, i.e., to permit a convey-
ance of the surface rights. The inclusion or ommission of 
a mineral reservation was merely incidental. 
But even if there were factual and evidentiary sup-
port for the quoted statement in the majority opinion 
concerning past administrative practices, we submit such 
a course of conduct on the part of the Land Board or 
the other administrative officers or agents involved 
would not be material. School section lands such as here 
involved are held by the State of Utah in trust, in its 
governmental capacity. Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 
Utah 418, 422, 199 Pac. 670, 679. It follows that the 
state would not be bound by any unauthorized acts 
of its officers or agents in connection with the disposition 
of such lands. State v. District Court of Fourth Judicial 
District, 51 N.M. 297, 183 P.2d 607; Newton v. State 
Board of Land Commissioners, 37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 
1053. Compare also the opinion of the United States 
Supreme Court in the famous "tidelands" suit, United 
States v. State of California, 332 U. S. 19, 39-40, 67 Sup. 
Ct. 1658, 1668-1969. And as stated by the Supreme Court 
in United States v. City and County of San Franci·sco, 
310 U. S. 16, 31-32, 60 Sup. Ct. 7 49, 757: 
". . . We cannot accept the contention that 
administrative rulings- such as those here relied 
on - can thwart the plain purpose of a valid law. 
As to estoppel, it is enough to repeat that ' ... the 
United States is neither bound nor estopped by 
acts of its officers or agents in entering into an 
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arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be 
done what the law does not sanction or permit.' " 
In its concluding sentences the majority opinion 
assumes a philosophical attitude concerning the decision 
reached and indicates that a contrary decision would 
cause confusion, chaos and unfairness in land titles. It 
is intimated that for this reason the wording of 65-1-15 
should not be taken at its face value and given its ordinary 
and literal meaning - that the legislature of the State 
of Utah intended to preserve for the citizens of the State 
an inalienable interest in all minerals discovered under 
lands owned by the State. If such were the legislative 
intent, however, is it not "unfair" to warp the meaning 
of 65-1-15 by inserting therein an exception which is 
contrary to its own terms and thereby permit an illegal 
appropriation of state property and a deprivation of its 
use and benefits in so far as the residents of the State 
are concerned~ Such an "unfairness~~ is particularly sig-
nificant when, as the Inajorit:- opinion itself recognizes, 
the lands \vhich the State of 1Jtah received in exchange 
for its vested school sections had been deternrined to 
be non-1nineral in character. In other words, is it fair 
to approve a systen1 of exchanges under circun1stances 
where the Federal Govern1nent as an exchangor receiYed 
mineral right frmn the State of lTtah, but the State of 
Utah received onl~- lands detennined to be non-1nineral, 
even though surface values were considered equin1lent 1 
Furthennore, it 1nust be realized that in any judicial 
proceeding dealing with titles one party n1ust lose and 
one party must win. That which is "fair" in the nrind 
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of the prevailing party often seems "unfair" to the other 
party. Despite this personal approach, the American 
Judicial System always has recognized that that which 
is "fair'' is an impartial judicial decision predicated upon 
law and not upon sympathy nor upon what seem to be 
resultant complexities or vexing problems. Our judicial 
system has been criticized most in those situations where 
courts, for sociological, political or other convenient 
reasons, have strayed from a purely judicial approach 
to arrive at results which seemingly are consistent with 
the times or the present political temper. In so doing, 
it has not been uncommon for courts to utilize statutory 
interpretation as a device to make a statute appear to 
say exactly what it does not say. In utilizing this ap-
proach, statutory interpretation becomes the sceptre by 
which some courts suddenly become endowed with legis-
lative powers. Certainly, by the process of utilizing 
statutory interpretation to make 65-1-15 state that 
minerals shall not be reserved in exchanges with the 
United States, when in fact section 65-1-15 clearly and 
unmistakably states that all minerals shall be reserved, 
constitutes a legislative amendment to the statute which 
the 1919 and even the 1959 legislature would not have 
adopted. 
IV. 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION CONTEMPLATES DE-
CISION BY FIVE JUDGES NOT FOUR JUDGES. 
This case was heard and argued before a full Court 
of five judges. Only four judges actually participated in 
the decision, however, by reason of the death of Judge 
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Worthen between the time of argument and the filing 
of the opinion. The present decision was rendered by 
three judges with one judge dissenting. 
Although Section 2, Article VIII of the Utah Consti-
tution provides that: "A majority of the judges consti-
tuting the court shall be necessary to form a quorum 
or render a decision," it is clear also that the Constitution 
contemplates that the full complement of five judges 
should hear and participate in the decision. This is 
made evident by the provision of Section 2, Article VIII 
of the Constitution stating that: "If a justice of the 
supreme court shall be disqualified from sitting in a 
cause before said court, the remaining judges shall call 
a district judge to sit with them on the hearing of such 
cause." (Emphasis supplied) 
This Constitutional provision obviously contemplates 
that, absent a stipulation of the parties agreeing to a 
lesser number of judges, the litigants are entitled to a 
decision by five qualified judges. In this case, one of 
the five judges beca1ne disqualified by death prior to 
the decision of the Court. See In re Thompson's Estate, 
72 Utah 17, 86, 269 Pac. 103, 128. holding that "dis-
qualification" 1nay include the death of a judge. The 
parties before the Court in the case at bar did not agree 
nor stipulate to a decision by only four judges. ruder 
the circun1stanees, we submit that the Court should have 
called a district judge, as directed by the 1nandatory 
language of the Constitution, to sit with the rest of the 
Court and to participate in the decision. 
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It may be argued that Section 2, Article VIII 
permits a "majority" of the court "to form a quorun1 
or render a decision" and that in this case a majority 
of three did render a decision. But a fair reading of 
the Constitutional provision indicates that the reference 
is to a majority out of five judges, not to a majority 
out of four judges. It is well known in connection with 
the judicial process that a court decision represents the 
composite thinking of all members of the Court, pre-
sumably resulting from an exchange of arguments and 
ideas between all of its members. It is entirely possible 
that a majority out of five judges might emerge with a 
very different result, than would a majority out of four 
judges. Who can say what influence or persuasion the 
missing jurist might not exert on his fellow judges~ 
Even if the intent of the Constitutional provision 
were otherwise doubtful, we respectfully suggest that in 
a case as important as this, and in which the consequences 
are so serious and far-reaching, this Court should not 
render a landmark decision without the benefit of a full 
complement of its membership. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Court is well aware, the issues in this case 
have far-reaching significance and importance. At stake 
is nothing less than the right of the citizens of the 
State of Utah to a royalty interest in oil and gas and 
other mineral properties worth many millions of dollars. 
The chief beneficiaries of such rights are the public 
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schools of the state, in part supported by the revenues 
from state school sections involved in this dispute. 
Although these considerations alone should not, of course, 
be determinative of the outcome of the case, they do 
constitute good reason why this Court should arrive at 
a final judgment only after the most thorough and 
thoughtful judicial consideration of the issues presented. 
It is the earnest belief of the State of Utah that the 
majority opinion does not correctly resolve these legal 
issues, and that the importance of the case justifies a 
reconsideration by a full Court. For the reasons herein 
set forth, a rehearing is respectfully requested. 
Respectfully, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, State of 
Utah 
DEXXIS :JicC~-\.HTHY, 
Special .Assistant, 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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APPENDIX 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
SALT LAKE CITY 
May 28, 1931 
(SEAL) 
State Board of Land Commissioners, 
State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Gentlemen: 
George P. Parker 
Attorney General 
Lawrence A. Miner 
Byron D. Anderson 
M. Logan Rich 
Wm. A. Hilton 
Deputies 
In connection with "Indemnity School Land List 
049123," filed April 1, 1930, wherein the State of Utah 
selected the E¥2 of the SE%j of Section 11, the SE1;4 of 
the NW1;4 of Section 12, Twp. 37 South, Range 11 West 
of the Salt Lake Meridian, and the SE1;4 of the SE1;4 of 
Section 27, Twp. 17 South, Range 16 East of the Salt 
Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres, and offered to 
exchange therefor Lots 1 and 2 of the S:lf2 of the SE1;4 
of Section 16, Twp. 22 South, Range 2 East of the Salt 
Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres, embraced in the 
Fish Lake National Forest, you refer to me letter ad-
dressed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office 
to the Register of the U. S. Land Office at Salt Lake 
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City, Utah, under date of September 15, 1930, wherein 
the Commissioner rules that unless the State of Utah 
furnishes a written coal consent under the acts of June 
22, 1910 (36 Stats. 583) and April 30, 1912, (37 Stats. 
105) as to the SE1;4 of the SE1;4 of Section 27, Twp. 17 
South, Range 16 East of the Salt Lake Meridian, the 
lease will be held for rejection, and by reason thereof 
you request me to advise you whether or not in my 
opinion the State Land Board is authorized by our law 
to waive mineral rights to the United States in lands 
so selected and take only surface rights in such lands 
for the surrender of full title to the base lands. 
A discussion of the laws under which r tah acquired 
title to its school lands in place and also of its right 
to surrender base lands and select other lands in lieu 
thereof, and the powers of the State Land Board in 
relation to such lands is necessary to reach a conclusion. 
By Utah's Enabling .... \.ct (:28 Stats. 107) the state 
was granted Sections 2, 16, 3:2 and 36 in each township 
of the state for the support of its connnon schools, and 
where such sections, or any parts thereof, had been sold 
or otherwise disposed of by the l~nited States. other 
lands equivalent thereto were and are granted to the 
State h~T the Act. The Act further provides that any of 
such sections embraced in pennanent reservations shall 
not at an~· tin1e be subject to the grant nor to the in-
denlnity provisions of the Act until the reservation shall 
have lwPn extinguished and such lands restored to the 
public domain. 
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It will be observed that Utah's Enabling Act did not 
give this state the right to select other lands in lieu 
of Sections 2, 16, 32, and 36, or parts thereof, where 
the United States had, prior to survey, disposed of 
them, or parts thereof, and where said sections were 
mineral lands included in any reservation. But by the 
provisions of the Act of May 3, 1902 (32 Stats. 188) the 
provisions of the school land indemnity Act (26 Stats. 
796, Act of February 28, 1891) were made to apply to 
the State of Utah. The School land indemnity Act pro-
vides, among other things, that in all cases where the 
United States has disposed of school sections in place 
prior to survey or any such sections are included in any 
Indian, Military or other reservation or are mineral 
lands other lands of equal acreage are appropriated and 
granted, and out of them the State may select within its 
boundaries nonmineral surveyed lands in lieu of those 
thus disposed of or included in reservations. But the 
State, by the Act, has a right to await the extinguishment 
of any reservation and then take the sections in place 
therein. 
Thus, it will be seen, the State's right of selection 
IS definitely established. The right, however, (prior to 
the Act of January 25, 1927) is a restricted one, because 
under the school land indemnity Act the State could not 
select known mineral lands and under the State's Enab-
ling Act, as construed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of United States vs. Sweet, 
245 U. S. 563, the grant did not include lands of known 
mineral character. Under the law as thus established it i:3 
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palpably clear that whenever the State surrenders its 
titled school tract, it has the unconditional right to select 
a tract of equal acreage in lieu thereof, and the only ele-
ment to be dealt with in the selection (prior to the Act 
of January 25, 1927) is whether or not at the time of such 
selection the selected lands are of known mineral charac-
ter. If such is true then the state has no right to these-
lected lands. If the contrary is true then the State's right 
to the selected lands is absolute. The rights of the States 
under the school lands indemnity Act have been passed 
upon by the Supreme Court of the L nited States in 
several recent cases. In the case of \Yyonring vs. United 
States, 255 U. S. 489, the facts were approximately as 
follows: 
"The State of \\~yoming \\aived its right to 
a school tract in a reservation and selected in 
lieu thereof a tract of equal acreage from the 
public lands within the state and outside of the 
reservation, and it performed e\ery act \\hich -was 
required of it in ,,~aiTing its base lands and select-
ing the lieu lands. The list remained in the General 
Land Office awaiting consideration for upwards 
of three ~~ears. In the n1eantime (two years after 
the selection) the selected laud, \'lith other lands, 
were included in a te1nporary executive with-
drRwal a; po:::sihle oil laud under the ~~ct of June 
2G, 1910. The Connnissioner tl1en con1ing to con-
sider the selection declined to approve it as made 
nnd c>alled upon the State to either accept a limited, 
- surface-right, - certification of the selected 
land or to show cause that it still was not known 
or believed to be Inineral. The State declined to 
accede to either alternatiYe and insisted that its 
rights should be deter1nined as of the tin1e ·when 
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the waiver and selection were made, and, after 
applying that test, it became invested with the 
equitable title to the selected land two years prior 
to the temporary withdrawal, and at a time when 
that land was neither known or believed to be 
mineral. The Commissioner thereupon ordered 
the selection cancelled, not because it was in any 
respects objectionable when made, but on the 
theory that he was justified in rejecting it by 
reason of the subsequent withdrawal and subse-
quent oil discoveries in that vicinity. In the mean-
time the State had given a lease permitting the 
lessee to drill the selected land. There was no 
drilling or oil discovery at the time the lease was 
given, but thereafter drilling was prosecuted at a 
large cost and carried to a successful production 
of oil, which was four years after the selection." 
The Supreme Court in passing upon the rights of 
the State under the facts as above stated made the fol-
lowing cogent remarks and rulings: 
"At that time (time of selection) the State 
had a perfect title to the tract in the reserve and 
the land selected in lieu thereof was vacant, un-
appropriated and neither known or believed to 
be mineral. The list fully conformed to the di-
rections on the subject issued by the Secretary 
of the Interior and was accompanied by the requi-
site proofs and the proper fees. Notice of selection 
was duly posted and published, proof thereof was 
duly made and the state paid the publisher's 
charge. Thus, * * * the state did everything 
necessary to show a perfect title to the land re-
linquished and perfect relinquishment thereof to 
the Government, and everything that was required 
either by statute or by regulation of the Land 
Department in selecting the lieu land instead of 
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the relinquished tract * * *. The question pre-
sented is whether, considering that the selection 
was lawfully made in lieu of the state owned tract 
contemporaneously relinquished, and that nothing 
remained to be done by the state to perfect the 
selection, it was admissable for the Commissioner 
and the Secretary to disapprove and reject it on 
the ground that the selected land was withdrawn 
two years later under the Act of June 25, 1910, 
and still later was discovered to be mineralland,-
that is, to be valuable for oil. Or, putting it in an-
ther way, the question is whether it was admiss-
able for those officers to test the validity of the 
selection by the changed conditions when they 
came to examine it, instead of by the conditions 
existing when the state relinquished the tract in 
the forest reserve and selected the other in its 
stead." 
"In principle it is plain that the validity of 
the selection should be determined as of the time 
when it was made when it ,,~as made: that is, ac-
cording to the conditions then existing. The pro-
posal for the exchange of land "ithout, for land 
within the reserve ca1ne fron1 Congress. Accept-
ance rested with the State, and controlled by the 
conditions existing at the tilne. It is not as if the 
selection was 1nerel~~ a proposal by the state which 
the land officers could accept or reject. They had 
no such option to exercise. but were charged \nth 
the dut~r of ascertaining whether the State's 
waiver and selection 1net the require1nents of the 
congressional proposal, and of giving or \\ithhold-
ing their approYal accordingly. The power con-
fided to then1 "\Yas not that of granting or denying 
a privilege to the State, but of detern1ining 
whether an existing priYileg-e conferred bY Con-
gress had been lawfnll)T exer~ised,-in other 'words, 
their action was to be judicial in its nature and 
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directed to an ascertainment and declaration of 
the effect of the waiver and selection by the State 
in 1912. If these were valid then,-if they met all 
the requirements of the congressional proposal in-
cluding the directions given by the Secretary, -
they remained valid notwithstanding the subse-
quent change in conditions. Acceptance of such a 
proposal, and full compliance therewith, confer 
vested rights which all must respect. Equity then 
regards the State as the owner of the selected 
tract, and the United States as owning the other; 
and this equitable ownership carried with it what-
ever of advantage or disadvantage may arise from 
a subsequent change in conditions, whether one 
tract or the other be affected. Of course, the 
State's right under the selection was precisely the 
same as if, in 1912, it had made a cash entry of 
the selected land under an applicable statute; for 
the waiver of its right to the tract in the forest 
reserve was the equivalent of a cash consideration. 
And yet it hardly would be suggested that the 
Commissioner or the Secretary, on coming to con-
sider the cash entry, could do otherwise than ap-
prove it, if, at the time it was made, the land 
was open to such an entry, and the amount paid 
was the lawful price. * * *" 
"The Land DP-partment uniformly has ruled 
that the States acquire a vested right in all school 
sections in place which are not otherwise ap-
propriated, and not known to be mineral, at the 
time they are identified by the survey,-or at the 
date of the grant~ where the survey precedes it,-
regardless of ',vhen the matter becomes a subject 
of inquiry and decision, and that this right is not 
defeated or affected by a subsequent mineral 
discovery. And, as respects cash entries and 
entries under the pre-emption, homestead, desert 
land, and kindrd laws, the Land Department 
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always had ruled that if, when the claimant has 
done all that he is required to do to entitle him to 
receive the title, the land is not known _to be 
mineral, he acquires a vested right which no sub-
sequent discovery of mineral will divest or 
disturb. And this rule has been applied by that 
Department, although not uniformly, to selections 
made in lieu of relinquished lands in public reser-
vations. Thus, in Kern Oil Co. v. ·Clark, 30 Land 
Dec. 550, where a lieu selection under the Act of 
June 4, 1897, chap. 2, 30 Stats. at L. 36, 9 Fed. 
Stats. Anno. 2d ed p. 587, was under consideration, 
the Secretary of the Interior said, p. 556: 'When 
do rights under the selection become vested~ In 
the disposition of the public lands of the United 
States, under the laws relating thereto, it is 
settled law: (1) That when a party has complied 
with all the terms and conditions necessary to 
the securing of title to a particular tract of land, 
he acquires a vested interest therein, is regarded 
as the equitable owner thereof, and thereafter the 
govern1nent holds the legal title in trust for him; 
(2) that the right to a patent, once vested, is, 
for most purposes, equivalent to a patent issued, 
and when in fact issued, the patent relates back 
to the tin1e when the right to it became fixed: and 
(3) that the conditions with respect to the state 
or character of the land, as they exist at the time 
when all the necessary requirernents have been 
complied with b~~ a person seeking title, determine 
the question whether the land is subject to sale or 
otlwr disposal, and no change in such conditions, 
subsequently occurring, can iinpair or in any 
1nanner affect his rights.' ~-\_gain. p. 560: 'These 
establi~hed principles, in the opinion of the De-
pa.rtnwnt. are applicable to selections under the 
Act of ,June 4, 1S97. The act clearly contemplates 
an eJ.xhallpc of cquica.lents. Such is the wzmis-
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takable import of its terms. In the case of relin-
quishment of patented lands, title is to be given 
by the government for title received.' And again p. 
564: 'It would be strange indeed if, by the latter 
Act, Congress intended that one who accepting 
the government's offer of exchange, relinquishes 
a tract to which he has obtained full title in a 
forest reservation, and in lieu thereof selects a 
tract of land which, at the time, is vacant and 
open to settlement, and does all that is required 
of him to complete the selection and to perfect 
the exchange, should there by acquire only an 
inchoate right to the selected tract, liable to be 
defeated by subsequent discoveries of mineral at 
any time before patent, or before final action 
upon the selection by the Land Department. Such 
a construction would not only tend to defeat the 
objects for which the act was passed, by dis-
couraging owners of lands in forest reservations 
from giving up their titles, but would be against 
both the letter and spirit of the Act. Parties would 
be slow indeed to relinquish the.ir complete titles 
if it were once understood that they could obtain 
only do~tbtful or contingent rights in return fo1· 
them. It could not have been the ~ntention of 
Congress that parties accept.ing the government's 
offer of exchange should be embarrassed by any 
such conditions of doubt and uncertainty. * * *"' 
"The only exception to the general rule before 
stated respecting the time as of which the charac-
ter of the land-whether mineral or nonmineral-
is to be determined js one which, in principle and 
practice, is confined to railroad land grants. From 
the beginning the Land Department, by reason of 
the terms of those grants and the restrictive in-
terpretation to which they are subjected, uniform-
ly has constr11ed and treated them as requiring 
that the character of the land be determined as of 
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the time when the patents issue. * * *Barden vs. 
Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 154 U. S. 
288. * * *Plainly the decision in that case is with- ! 
out bearing here, save as it recognizes that rights 
under other land laws are to be tested by a 
different rule. * * * ." 
"And it is further significance that this court 
has recognized that the legislation of Congress 
designed to aid the common schools of the states 
is to be construed liberally rather than restric-
tively. * * * 
It results that the SecretarY erred in matter 
of law in rejecting the selecti~n, and that the 
District Court rightly entered a decree for the 
defendants." 
In my mind it is perfectly plain that the real 
authority and duties of the Interior Department are ~ 
unambiguously pointed out in the case of \Yyoming vs. 
United States, supra, and that there is nothing therein 
or in the law contained that in any,,ise contemplates 
that the Commissioner of the General Land Office or 
the Secretary of the Interior should or have the right to 
demand that the State wai,~e to the lTnited States any 
rninerals presu1ned to exist in a selected tract as a con-
dition precedent to the approval of the selection, where 
the State has completely c01nplied with the law and 
rules and regulations of the departinent relating to the 
relinquishrnent of its titled tract and the selection of a 
tract in lieu thereof. There is no burden cast upon the 
state to prove be~~ond question tlw nonn1ineral character 
of the selected lands. As unrnistakeably pointed out by 
the Suprmne Court of the lTnited States, when the State 
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has done all that it is required to do in relinquishing its 
school tract in place and selecting another tract therefor~ 
the department has no alternative but to approve the 
list without exacting or imposing upon the State condi-
tions not contained in the law. With the selection in 
question we are not concerned with the question of 
minerals subsequently discovered, but we are concerned 
with the rule or principle of law announced by the Su-
preme Court of the United States that when the State 
has fully performed all of the things or acts required 
of it in the relinquishment and selection and furnished 
its proofs specified, the department has no option to 
exercise but is charged with the judicial duty of merely 
ascertaining whether the State's relinquishment and 
selection meet the requirements of the Congressional 
proposal. If that is true then the department must 
approve the selection. The Wyoming case, supra, was 
prosecuted primarily upon the power of the Land De-
partment to demand a waiver of minerals in the selected 
land. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in that case, above quoted in part, clearly estab-
lished that the requirement of the Land Department was 
unauthorized in law and void. 
It is probably appropriate here to consider what 
effect, if any, the provisions of the rnineral school 
land-grant Act of 1927, (84 Stats. 1026) has upon the 
relinquishment of school sections in place included in 
reservations and the selection of other lands in lieu 
thereof. By the act the several grants to the States of 
numbered school sections in place for the support of 
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the public schools is extended to embrace numbered school 
sections mineral in character. The school land indemnity 
act gives the States the right to select nonrninerallands 
upon relinquishment of numbered school sections in 
reservations. The school land indemnity Act, however, 
was in consonance with the settled policy of Congress 
relating to the disposal of known mineral lands, United 
States vs. Sweet, supra. This policy, however, was 
changed by the provisions of the Act of January 25, 
1927, whereby numbered school sections in place of 
known mineral character passed to the States under 
their respective grants. Under this changed policy of 
Congress, it is only reasonable to conclude that Congress 
intended, by the Act of January 25, 1927, that the school 
land indemnity Act should be modified accordingly and 
that the States would have the right to select mineral 
lands from the unappropriated public don1ain within their 
borders in place of its mineral numbered school sections. 
This conclusion is strengthened by the ruling of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Wy-
oming vs. United States, supra, that the legislation of 
Congress designed to aid the conunon schools of the 
States is to be construed liberally rather than restric-
tively and by the further fad that the Interior Depart-
ment has held that the acts of Congress permitting 
exchanges conten1plates the exchange of equivalents. 
While the act of June :2. 1910 (36 Stats. 5S3) a5 
amended by the act of April 30, 1912 (37 Stats. 105) 
gives the Secretary of the Interior the power to accept 
waivers of coal in lands selected, still those arts are 
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not binding upon the States and do not in anywise fix 
or limit the rights of the States in the selection of 
such lands. 
The next question to consider is whether or not you 
have express authority under State statutes to waive or 
relinquish the absolute rights of the State in and to its 
school lands; that is, have you the power and authority 
to waive to the Federal Government the coal or other 
minerals in lands selected to replace numbered school 
sections relinquished. By the provisions of Section 5575, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, as amended by Laws of 
1925, page 52, you are given the direction, management 
and control of all lands heretofore granted or which may 
be hereafter granted to the State by the Federal Govern-
ment, with power to sell or lease the same for the best 
interests of the State. By the provisions of Sections 5577 
and 5580 you are authorized to make all necessary 
selections of lands under the various grants from the 
Federal Government to the State, and to take such action 
as shall be necessary to secure the approval of the 
proper officers of the United States and the final trans-
fer to this state of the lands selected. By the provisions 
of Sections 5575 and 5575X all coal and other mineral 
deposits in lands belonging to the State are reserved to 
the State and can be disposed of only on a rental and 
c royalty basis. By the provisions of Section 5575X1 all 
applications to purchase lands of the State shall be 
subject to the reservation to the State of all coal and 
. other mineral deposits, and by the provisions of Section 
; 5575X2 all sales of State lands shall be subject to the 
reserved mineral rights. 
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A careful reading of Title 101, Sections 5571 to 5681, 
inclusive, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, as amended by 
Laws of 1921 and 1925, fails to disclose any power or 
authority, expressed or implied, in the State Land 
Board to waive minerals to the Federal Government 
as a condition precedent to the approval of a selection 
by the Secretary of the Interior or as an inducement 
to the Secretary of the Interior to approve such selection. 
The power given the State Land Board "to take such 
action as shall be necessary to secure approval of the 
proper officers of the Lnited States and the final trans-
fer to this State of lands selected" merely means that 
the State Land Board shall do all that is required under 
existing law to be done in order to effect the relinquish-
ment and selection, and does not give any power and 
authority to accept in exchange for school lands in place 
included in a reservation lands of lesser acreage, or 
lesser value, or a part of the selected lands, that is. a 
mere surface right, a split title, - or all of said selected 
lands except certain 1ninerals ; in other words there is no 
law giving the State Land Board power to \Yaive coal 
or other minerals to the Federal Govermnent in lands 
selected for school lands in place. The word "lands" as 
used in the laws here in question has been judicially 
construed to include "not only the surface of the earth 
but ever~·thing under or over it.'' Garnsey Coal Company 
vs. Mudd, 281 Fed. 43, Sox Ys. l\Iiracle, 160 N.W. 716. 
Walpole vs. State Board of Land Conunissioners, 163 
Pac. 848. 
Right here H is interesting to note Chapter 56 Laws 
of 1927, hy the provisions of which the legislature au-
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thorized the State Land Board to convey to the United 
States title to certain lands in the vicinity of the mouth 
of Bear River and comprising a part of the bed of Great 
Salt Lake upon the condition that all minerals therein 
be reserved to the State. Such condition is indicative 
of the determination of the legislature to safeguard the 
minerals of the State. I cannot find that the legislature 
has ever authorized any State Land Board to waive 
minerals to the United States in lands selected, but since 
the year 1919, when the State mineral-reservation Act 
became effective, it has been the policy of the State 
to reserve all minerals to itself, and to dispose of them 
only by lease. 
In view of the remarks herein above contained it 
is clear that it is my opinion, and I hold, that the State 
Land Board is without authority of law to waive coal 
or other minerals to the United States in lands selected 
to take the place of numbered school sections in reserva-
tions. I am further of the opinion, and so hold, that the 
Secretary of the Interior is without right under the 
Federal laws and cases hereinabove mentioned to demand 
of the State as a condition precedent to the approval of 
the selection list that the State waive the coal or other 
minerals in the land selected by the State. If the State 
has done all that it is required to do under the law in 
connection with the selection here in question, then as 
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the case of Wyoming vs. United States, supra, the de-
partment has only the judicial duty to determine that 
question and if it finds that the State has thus complied 
with the law it must approve the selection. 
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I suggest that the matter be presented to the Interior 
Department in the light of the views expressd in this 
opinion. 
6x-G 
Yours very respectfully, 
jsj George P. Parker 
Attorney General 
APPEXDIX 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORXEY GEXER~ll 
SALT LAKE CITY 
February 6, 1935 
(SEAL) 
Joseph Chez 
Attorney General 
John D. Rice 
S. D. Huffaker 
Grover A. Giles 
Ralph S. Calder 
Deputies 
Hon. George A. Fisher, Executive Secretary 
State Land Board 
Building 
Dear Mr. Fisher: 
I acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 4, 
1935, in which you state that the Land Board is con· 
sidering the exchange of a large acreage of school lands 
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for public domain lands, with a view of consolidating 
the State's holdings, as authorized by the Taylor Grazing 
Act. You desire to know if it is necessary to have any 
new legislation in order to accomplish this grouping of 
lands. 
Under the provisions of Section 86-1-58, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, the Land Board is authorized to 
exchange any of the State lands for other lands of equal 
value. This section, however, provides: 
"That no exchange shall be made by the land 
board until a patent for the land so received in 
exchange shall have been issued to such proprie-
tors or their grantors." 
This section should be amended permitting exchanges 
with the United States Government in accordance with 
the terms of the Taylor Act. 
I also call your attention to the fact that under our 
present laws you are required to reserve all mineral 
rights when disposing of State lands. It is not likely that 
the Government would consent to such a reservation 
in the exchange of lands as contemplated by you, and 
for this reason I would suggest that the law be amended 
authorizing you to make such exchanges with the United 
States Government without mineral reservation, pro-
viding, of course, that the Government does not reserve 
mineral rights to the lands granted by it in such an 
exchange. 
Difficulties may arise with the various State insti-
tutions regarding these exchanges, and in some instances 
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it may be necessary to get the consent of the institutions 
in order to make such exchanges. These rna tters, however, 
can be taken care of as they arise. 
8:EL 
Most respectfully yours, 
jsj Joseph Chez 
Attorney General 
THE STATE OF -cTAH 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEXERAL 
SALT LAKE CITY 
June 1, 1951 
(SEAL) 
Mr. Robert H. Ruggeri 
Ti tie Examiner 
State Land Board 
Building 
Dear Mr. Ruggeri: 
This is in response to your request. for an opinion 
from this office of the follo"ing Inatters dealing with 
the disposition of state lands: 
(1) May the Land Board agree with the 
Federal Govern1nent not to issue prospecting and 
Inining leases on state lands already leased to 
the Federal Govern1nent for other pui·poses? 
( 2) If the Land Board is surressful in ef-
f('et ing an exehange of lands with the Federal 
Governn1ent, can the Land Board transfer the 
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fee, or would it be required to reserve the mineral 
rights in this exchange~ 
As you are aware, under the provisions of Title 86, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, the Land Board 
has been vested with the direction, management and 
control of all state lands. Any disposition of state lands, 
however, must be in accordance with the Constitution 
and laws of the State of Utah. 
With reference to your first question, it is our 
opinion that the Land Board may agree with the Federal 
Government not to issue prospecting and mining leases 
on lands already leased to the Federal Government for 
other purposes should it be the judgment of the board 
that such agreement would best subserve the interests 
of the State. 
While Section 86-1-24 provides, in part, that "The 
board shall cause all public lands now owned * * * or 
* * * which may hereafter be vested in the state, to be 
classified and registered and thereafter sold or leased," 
it is also provided in Section 86-1-18, as amended by 
Chapter 84, Laws of Utah 1945, and Chapter 129, Laws 
of Utah 1947, that "The board may lease for prospecting 
and mining purposes any portions of the unsold, unleased 
lands of the State * * *." 
In interpreting similar discretionary power con-
ferred upon the Land Board with reference to the sale 
of state lands, our Supreme Court held in Miles v. Wells, 
22 Utah 55, 61 Pac. 534, that a court had no jurisdiction 
to direct by mandamus how this discretionary power 
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should be exercised. In the course of its opinion the 
court said: 
The language of Sec. 16, in this regard, is, 
"The board may select ~nd contract to sell" etc. 
Therefore unless the term "may" is clearly shown 
by context of said section or by other provisions 
of the act to have been used in the sense of must, 
or if by giving to it that meaning other provisions 
of the statute would be neutralized, then the nat-
ural and ordinary meaning of that word must con-
trol, and said board may at their option, select and 
contract to sell the lands donated to the State, and 
applied for by a citizen, or refrain from doing so. 
There are no provisions of the statute which 
indicate that that term was used in any other 
than its ordinary sense. To have done so would 
have neutralized the plain provisions of some, and 
materially modiifed others, of the sections of the 
statute hereinbefore cited. 
With reference to your second question, we are of 
the opinion that the board is not authorized to effect an 
exchange of lands ·with Federal Go\ernment without a 
reservation of all coal and other nrinerals. \Y e have not 
been able to find any express or implied authority for 
the Land Board to effect an exchange of lands except that 
contained in Section 86-1-58. which provides as follows: 
In order to cmnpact, as far as practicable, 
the land holdings of the state, the board is hereby 
authorized to exchange any of the land held by 
the state for other land of equal Yalue within the 
~tate held by other proprietors: and upon request 
of the board the goYernor is herebY authorized 
to <'xeentP and deliYer the necessar~T patents to 
such otlwr proprietors and receive tl1erefrom 
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proper deeds of the lands so exchanged ; provided, 
that no exchange shall be made by the land board 
until a patent for the land so received in ex-
change shall have been issued to such proprietors 
or their grantors. 
The Land Board has been vested with the authority 
embodied in this section since the enactment of Section 
45, Chapter XXXVII, Laws of Utah, 1897. 
In 1919, however, pursuant to the provisions of 
Chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1919, the Legislature made 
an outright reservation to the state of all coal and other 
minerals deposited in lands belonging to the state and 
also provided that all applications to purchase state 
lands subsequent thereto be subject to such a reservation. 
In making the aforesaid reservation the Legislature made 
no distinction between "sales" and "exchanges" of state 
lands, but went on to provide how such deposits should 
be disposed of. These same provisions are now embodied 
substantially in Sections 86-1-15 and 86-1-16 Utah Code 
Annotated 1943. 
A strict interpretation of the language of Section 
86-1-58, supra, would permit an exchange of lands \vith 
the Federal Government only as to those lands for which 
a patent has been issued and which had thereafter been 
reacquired by the Federal Government. We believe, how-
ever, that a reasonable construction of the language, 
in order to effectuate its manifest purpose, would per:mit 
an exchange of lands with the Federal Government, even 
as to unpatented lands as long as the title thereto was 
still vested in the Federal Government. The exchange 
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would necessarily have to be in accordance with and sub-
ject to the limitations of Section 86-1-58. 
In view of the foregoing legislative mandates, it is 
the opinion of this office that any exchange of state lands 
with the Federal Government must be under and pur. 
suant to the provisions of Section 86-1-58 to "compact, 
as far as practicable, the land holdings of the state" and 
also subject to a reservation to the state of all coal and 
other minerals. 
Very truly yours, 
/s/ Clinton D. ,~ ernon 
CLIXTOX D. VERXOX 
Attorney General 
THE ST.A.TE OF l-TA.H 
OFFICE OF THE A.TTORXEY GEXERAL 
SALT L~~KE CITY 
(SEAL) 
E. R. Callister 
Attorney General 
State Land Board 
Building 
December 6, 1954 
REQUESTED BY: Joseph P. 1frCarthy. Title E:x-
aininer, State Land Board. 
OPINION BY: E. R. Callister, Attorney General; 
H. R. 'V aldo, Jr., Assistant Attor-
ne~~ General. 
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CONCLUSIONS: 
XX Ill 
1. Must the State Land Board, pur-
suant to Sec. 65-1-15, U.C.A. 1953, 
reserve mineral rights (a) in land, 
title to which is not vested in the 
state and for which a fee simple 
title in land is obtained in lieu 
thereof or in exchange from the 
United States; (b) in land, title to 
which has vested in the state in 
exchange for which a fee simple 
title in other land is obtained from 
the United States~ 
2. May the State Land Board ex-
change the surface rights in state 
land for the surface rights in fed-
erally owned land, both the state 
and the United States reserving 
mineral rights~ 
1. (a) No. 
(b) Yes. 
2. Yes. 
The questions involved here arise in a variety of circum-
stances. The most common situation is where unsurveyed 
school sections are included within a federal withdrawal 
: or other reservation. In that event the State has the 
option of selecting lieu land outside the reservation for 
, the school sections lost or awaiting the cancellation or 
'r 
, extinguishment of the withdrawal or reserve. The ques-
, tion may also arise where the State is desirous of con-
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solidating its holdings in a block and exchanges state 
owned land in one area for federally owned land adjacent 
to state owned land in another area. The same situation 
may arise where the Federal Government desires a 
particular piece of state land for federal use and a trade 
is proposed. 
Sec. 65-1-15 provides in part: 
All coal and other minerals deposited in lands 
belonging to the state of Utah are hereby re-
served to the state. 
This provision is mandatory and self-executing and 
gives no discretion to the Land Board. See Attorney 
General's opinions of May 10, 1954, No. 54-050, and 
April11, 1922. 
As noted above, where lieu land is taken for unsur-
veyed lands included within a federal reservation or with-
drawal, the state is entitled to select lands outside the 
reservation or withdrawal. in lieu of lands included within 
the withdrawal. The sa1ne right is gi\en for land lawfully 
occupied by a private person at the time the State·s title 
vests. In either case the State is exchanging a potential 
title to land within the "ithdrawal for a present title 
in fee simple in land outside the withdrawal. It is a 
potential title because title to a specific school section 
does not vest in the State until a surYey is made and 
accepted by the Secretary of the Interior and not then 
if the land is included within a federal reservation or 
is owned by s01ne priYate person, see U.S. Y. 'Yyoming, 
331 U. S. 440. The question of whether the State has any 
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>1 interest in an unsurveyed school section so as to prevent 
I~ entry thereon by a private person is presently being 
~ litigated. The question raised in that case has not been 
~ directly considered by any court. Present law would 
r indicate that the State cannot successfully assert such 
a claim. But even if the State were successful in this 
contention, the State would not have any title to the 
unsurveyed land for the Federal government could 
ill. defeat the State's rights entirely by creating a reserva-
tion or withdrawal on such land prior to survey. U. S. 
v. Wyoming, supra. It must therefore be held, regardless 
~ of the outcome of the litigation, that the State has only 
~: a potential title prior to survey. It is, therefore, our 
opinion that an unsurveyed school section is not land 
1!: 
"belonging to the state of Utah" within the meaning of 
Sec. 65-1-15 so that minerals need not be reserved where 
land is taken in lieu of such unsurveyed land. 
This conclusion is strengthened by a consideration 
!l; of the purpose of the School Land Indemnity Act of 
1891 ( 43 U.S.C. 851, 853) under which selection of lieu 
land is authorized. The act contemplates an exchange of 
ffl equivalents (Wyoming v. U. S., 255 U. S. 489), that is, 
:~ a complete waiver by the State of all its right to un-
surveyed land within a reservation or withdrawal and 
the granting therefor of a full fee simple title in land ll 
outside the withdrawal or reservation. The mineral 
~~: 
reservation law of 1919 ( 65-1-15) was passed when the 
ri 
Indemnity Act of 1891 had been in effect for many years 
~[ 
and the mechanics of which were well known. Had the 
Legislature intended to require a reservation of minerals 
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1n unsurveyed land, no further indemnity land could 
be obtained for the "exchange of equivalents" would 
never exist. We cannot believe the Legislature intended 
such a result. 
A different question is presented where title has 
passed to the State. In the event the mineral reservation 
would, in terms, apply. We can see no way to avoid this 
requirement even though in a given case it may operate 
to defeat an otherwise proper and advantageous ex-
change of lands between the State and the Federal 
government. This is in accord with an opinion of the 
Attorney General of February 6, 1935, but reverses, in 
part, the Attorney General's opinion of October 2, 1937. 
See also opinion of July 2-±, 1950, #1342. 
In answer to your second question, we believe the 
general discretion of the Land Board in dealing with 
state land authorizes the exchange of surface rights in 
state land for surface rights in federally owned land. 
See 65-1-14. No conflict with the mineral reservation law 
is here involved for minerals are reserved by both the 
State and the Federal governn1ent. 
Legal principles applicable to both questions here 
presented were discussed at length in two opinions of 
the Attorney General issued on ~Iarch 11 and ~Iay 28. 
1931. The facts of both opinions were the same. rnsur-
veyed school sections had been ineluded in a forest 
reserve and the State had selected certain lands outside 
the reserve as inde1nnity for the school sections within 
the reserve. rrlw Secretary of Interior refused to approve 
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the selection of the particular lands unless the State 
would waive its mineral rights to the lands selected. In 
holding that the Land Board could not waive mineral 
rights in the lands selected, the then Attorney General 
made several observations as to the law relating to such 
land transactions. 
First, he stated that the Secretary of Interior had 
no authority to require a waiver of mineral rights and 
the Land Board had no authority to waive mineral rights 
in selected lands. Under the provisions of the School 
Land Indemnity Act of 1891, the State is entitled to 
select land not known to be valuable for .mineral and 
obtain a fee simple title therefor. The selected land may 
contain mineral but if it is not known at the time of the 
selection to be valuable for mineral, the State is entitled 
to select it. The Attorney General ruled that the only 
authority of the Secretary of Interior was to reject the 
selection of lands known to be valuable for mineral or 
approve the selection of lands not known to be valuable 
for mineral, but no authority is given to require a waiver 
of mineral rights from the State. We agree with this 
conclusion. Wyoming v. U. S., 255 U. S. 489; Brigham 
City v. Rich, 34 Utah 130. 
Second, the Attorney General ruled that "land" 
meant a fee simple title. The Land Board is only author-
ized to select "land" and, therefore, the Land Board 
may not select the surface of a piece of land and waive 
the mineral rights for they would not then be selecting 
"land." This result and the legal principle is correct, 
where a selection is made under the School Land In-
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demnity Act, but it can have no application to exchanges 
of land. The Land Board by Sec. 65-1-14 is given "the 
direction, management and control of all lands heretofore 
or hereafter granted to this state." By Sec. 65-1-15 it is 
authorized to lease minerals; by 65-1-18 to lease for 
prospecting; by 65-1-29 to sell land; by 65-1-34 to sell 
timber. In other words the Land Board has the same 
authority to act as any private land owner subject, 
however, to its trust obligations. If it is advantageous 
to the State to exchange the surface of state-owned lands 
for the surface of federally owned lands, the State and 
the United States reserving mineral rights to themselves, 
there should be, and, in our opinion, is no legal objection 
to consummating such exchange. \\T e do not disagree 
with the results of the opinions of ~Iarch 11 and May 
28, 1931. Some of the discussion of the legal principles 
involved were stated more broadly than necessary and 
should be limited to the particular fact situation dis-
cussed in those opinions. 
For the foregoing reasons it is our opinion that the 
Land Board n1ust reserve mineral rights in land, title 
to which has vested in the State. but not in land, title 
to which has not yested in the State. It is further our 
opinion that the Land Board n1ay exchange the surface 
rights in state land for the surface rights in federally 
owned land. 
Y ery truly yours. 
/s/ E. R. Callister 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
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